Elizabeth F. Loftus
"memories" of events that did not actually occur).
In 1986 Nadean Cool, a nurse's aide in Wisconsin sought therapy from a psychiatrist to help her
cope with her reaction to a traumatic event experienced by her daughter. During therapy, the
psychiatrist used hypnosis and other suggestive techniques to dig out buried memories of abuse
that Cool herself had allegedly experienced. In the process Cool became convinced that she had
repressed memories of having been in a satanic cult, eating babies, of being raped, of having sex
with animals, and of being forced to watch the murder of her eight-year- old friend. She came to
believe that she had over 120 personalities -- children, adults, angels and even a duck-all because,
Cool was told, she had experienced severe childhood sexual and physical abuse. The psychiatrist
also performed exorcisms on her, one of which lasted for five-hours and included the sprinkling of
holy water and screams for Satan to leave Cool's body.
When Cool finally realized that false memories had been planted, she sued the psychiatrist for
malpractice. In March 1997, after five weeks of trial, her case was settled out of court for $2.4
Nadean Cool is not the only patient to develop false memories as a result of questionable therapy.
In Missouri, a church counselor helped Beth Rutherford to remember during therapy that her
father, a clergyman, had regularly raped her between the ages of seven and l4 and that her mother
sometimes helped him by holding her down. Under her therapist's guidance, Rutherford
developed memories of her father twice impregnating her and forcing her to abort the fetus herself
with a coat hanger. The father had to resign from his post as a clergyman when the allegations
were made public. Later medical examination of their daughter revealed, however, that she was
still a virgin at age 22 and had never been pregnant. The daughter sued the therapist and received a
$l million settlement in 1996.
About a year earlier two juries returned verdicts against a Minnesota psychiatrist accused of
planting false memories by former patients, Vynnette Hammane and Elizabeth Carlson, who,
under hypnosis and sodium amytal, and after being fed misinformation about the workings of
memory, had come to remember horrific abuse by family members. The juries awarded Hammane
$2.67 million and Carlson $2.5 million for their ordeals.
In all four cases, the women developed memories about childhood abuse in therapy and then later
denied their authenticity. How can we determine if memories of childhood abuse are true or false?
Without corroboration, it is very difficult to differentiate between false memories and true ones.
Also, in these cases, some memories are contrary to physical evidence, such as explicit and
detailed memories of rape and abortion when medical examination confirmed virginity. How is it
possible for people to acquire elaborate and confident false memories? A growing number of
investigations demonstrate that under the right circumstances false memories can be instilled rather
easily in some people.
My own research into memory distortion goes back to the early l970s when I began studies of the
"misinformation effect." These studies show that when people who witness an event are later
exposed to new and misleading information about it, their recollections often become distorted. In
one example, participants viewed a simulated automobile accident at an intersection with a stop
sign. After the viewing, half the participants received a suggestion that the traffic sign was a yield
sign. When asked later what traffic sign they remembered seeing at the intersection, those who had
been given the suggestion tended to claim that they had seen a yield sign. Those who had not
received the phony information were much more accurate in their recall of the traffic sign.
My students and I have now conducted more than 200 experiments involving over 20,000
individuals that document how exposure to misinformation induces memory distortion. In these
studies people "recalled" aconspicuous barn in a bucolic scene that contained no buildings at all,
broken glass and tape recorders that were not in the scenes they viewed, a white instead of the blue
vehicle in a crime scene, and Minnie Mouse when they actually saw Mickey Mouse. Taken
together, these studies show that misinformation can change an individual's recollection in
predictable and sometimes very powerful ways.
Misinformation has the potential for invading our memories when we talk to other people, when
we are interrogated in a suggestive fashion, or when we read or view media coverage about some
event that we may have experienced ourselves. After more than two decades exploring the power
of misinformation, researchers have learned a great deal about the conditions that make people
susceptible to memory modification. Memories are more easily modified, for instance, when the
passage of time allows the original memory to fade.
False Childhood Memories
It is one thing to change a detail or two in an otherwise intact memory but quite another to plant a
false memory of an event that never happened. To study false memory, my students and I first had
to find a way to plant a pseudomemory that would not cause our subjects undue emotional stress,
either in the process of creating the false memory or when we revealed that they had been
intentionally deceived. Yet we wanted to try to plant a memory that would be at least mildly
traumatic, had the experience actually happened.
My research associate, Jacqueline E. Pickrell, and I settled on trying to plant a specific memory of
being lost in a shopping mall or large department store at about the age of five. Here's how we did
it. We asked our subjects, 24 individuals ranging in age from 18 to 53, to try to remember
childhood events that had been recounted by their parents, older sibling or other close relative. We
prepared a booklet for each participant containing one-paragraph stories about three events that
actually happened to him or her, and one that had not. We constructed the false event using
information about a plausible shopping trip provided by a relative, who also verified that the
participant had not actually been lost at about the age of five. The lost-in-the-mall scenario included
the following elements: lost for an extended period of time, crying, aid and comfort by an elderly
woman and, finally, reunion with the family.
After reading each story in the booklet, the participants wrote what they remembered about the
event. If they did not remember it, they were told to write, "I do not remember this." In two
follow-up interviews, we told the participants that we were interested in examining how much
detail they could remember, and how their memories compared with those of their relative. The
event paragraphs were not read to them verbatim, but rather portions were provided as retrieval
cues. The participants remembered something about 49 of the 72 true events (68 percent)
immediately after the initial reading of the booklet and also in each of the two follow up interviews.
After reading the booklet, seven of the 24 participants (29 percent) remembered either partially or
fully the false event constructed for them, and in the two follow-up interviews six participants (25
percent) continued to claim that they remembered the fictitious event. Statistically, there were some
differences between the true memories and the false ones: participants used more words to describe
the true memories, and they rated the true memories as being somewhat more clear. But if an
on-looker were to observe many of our participants describe an event, it would be difficult indeed
to tell whether the account was of a true or a false memory.
Of course, being lost, however frightening, is not the same as being abused. But the
lost-in-the-mall study is not about real experiences of being lost; it is about planting false memories
of being lost. The paradigm shows a way of instilling false memories, and takes a step toward
allowing us to understand how this might happen in real world settings. Moreover, the study
provides evidence that people can be led to remember their past in different ways, and they can
even be coaxed into too "remembering" entire events that never happened.
Studies in other laboratories using a similar experimental procedure have produced similar results.
For instance, Ira Hyman, Troy H. Husband and F. James Billings of Western Washington
University asked college students to recall childhood experiences that had been recounted by their
parents. The researchers told the students that the study was about how people remember shared
experiences differently. In addition to actual events reported by parents, each participant was given
one false event -- either an overnight hospitalization for a high fever and a possible ear infection, or
a birthday party with pizza and a clown -- that supposedly happened at about the age of five. The
parents confirmed that neither of these events actually took place.
Hyman found that students fully or partially recalled 84 percent of the true events in the first
interview and 88 percent in the second interview. None of the participants recalled the false event
during the first interview, but 20 percent said they remembered something about the false event in
the second interview. One participant who had been exposed to the emergency hospitalization event
later remembered a male doctor, a female nurse and a friend from church who came to visit at the
In another study, along with true events Hyman presented different false events, such as
accidentally spilling a bowl of punch on the parents of the bride at a wedding reception or having to
evacuate a grocery store when the overhead sprinkler systems erroneously activate. Again, none of
the participants recalled the false event during the first interview, but 18 percent remembered
something about it in the second interview and 25 percent in the third interview. For example,
during the first interview one participant, when asked about the fictitious wedding event, stated, "I
have no clue. I have never heard that one before." In the second interview the participant said: "It
was an outdoor wedding and I think we were running around and knocked something over like the
punch bowl or something and um made a big mess and of course got yelled at for it."
The finding that an external suggestion can lead to the construction of false childhood memories
helps us understand the process by which false memories arise. It is natural to wonder whether this
research is applicable in real situations such as being interrogated by law officers or in
psychotherapy. Although strong suggestion may not routinely occur in police questioning or
therapy, suggestion in the form of an imagination exercise sometimes does. For instance, when
trying to obtain a confession law officers may ask a suspect to imagine having participated in a
criminal act. Some mental health professionals encourage patients to imagine childhood events as a
way of recovering supposedly hidden memories.
Surveys of clinical psychologists reveal that 11 percent instruct their clients to "let the imagination
run wild" and 22 percent tell their clients to "give free rein to the imagination." Therapist Wendy
Maltz, author of a popular book on childhood sexual abuse, advocates telling the patient: "Spend
time imagining that you were sexually abused, without worrying about accuracy, proving
anything, or having your ideas make sense. . . . Ask yourself. . .these questions: What time of day
is it? Where are you? Indoors or outdoors? What kind of things are happening? Is there one or
more person with you?" Maltz further recommends that therapists continue to ask questions such
as: "Who would have been likely perpetrators? When were you most vulnerable to sexual abuse in
The increasing use of such imagination exercises led me and several colleagues to wonder about
their consequences. What happens when people imagine childhood events that did not happen to
them? Does imagining a childhood event increase confidence that it occurred? To explore this, we
designed a three-stage procedure. We first asked individuals to indicate the likelihood that certain
events happened to them during their childhood. The list contains 40 events, each rated on a scale
ranging from "definitely did not happen" to "definitely did happen." Two weeks later, we asked
the participants to imagine that they had experienced some of these events. Different subjects were
asked to imagine different events. Some time later the participants again were asked to respond to
the original list of 40 childhood events, indicating how likely it was that these events actually
happened to them.
Consider one of the imagination exercises. The participants are told to imagine playing inside at
home after school, hearing a strange noise outside, running toward the window, tripping, falling,
reaching out and breaking the window with their hand. In addition, we asked participants
questions such as: "What did you trip on?" "How did you feel?"
In one study, 24 percent of the participants who imagined the broken-window scenario later
reported an increase in confidence that the event had occurred, whereas only 12 percent of those
who were not asked to imagine the event reported an increase in the likelihood that the event had
taken place. We found this "imagination inflation" effect in each of the eight events that participants
were asked to imagine. A number of possible explanations come to mind. An obvious one is that
an act of imagination simply makes the event seem more familiar and that familiarity is mistakenly
related to childhood memories rather than to the act of imagination. Such source confusion -- when
a person does not remember the source of information -- can be especially acute for the distant
events of childhood.
Studies of by Lyn Goff and Henry L. Roediger III of Washington University of recent rather than
childhood experiences more directly connect imagined actions to the construction of false memory.
During the initial session, the researchers instructed participants to perform the stated action,
imagine doing it, or just listen to the statement but do nothing else. The actions were simple ones
such as knock on the table, lift the stapler, break the toothpick, cross your fingers, roll your eyes.
During a second session, the participants were asked to imagine some of the actions that they had
not previously performed. During the final session, they answered questions about what actions
they actually performed during the initial session. The investigators found that the more times
participants imagined an unperformed action, the more likely they were to remember having
in part because the hippocampus, which plays a key role in the creation of memories, has not
matured enough to form and store long-lasting memories that can be retrieved in adulthood events.
A procedure for planting "impossible" memories about experiences that occur shortly after birth
has been developed by the late Nicholas Spanos and his collaborators at Carleton University.
Individuals are led to believe that they have well-coordinated eye movements and visual exploration
skills probably because they were born in hospitals that hung swinging colored mobiles over infant
cribs. To confirm whether they had such an experience, half of the participants are hypnotized,
age-regressed to the day after birth and asked what they remembered. The other half of the group
participates in a "guided mnemonic restructuring" procedure that also uses age regression as well
as active encouragement to re-create the infant experiences by imagining them.
Spanos and his co-workers found that the vast majority of their subjects were susceptible to these
memory-planting procedures. Both the hypnotic and guided participants reported infant memories.
Surprisingly, the guided group did so somewhat more (95 versus 70 percent). Both groups
remembered the colored mobile at a relatively high rate (56 percent of the guided group and 46
percent of the hypnotic subjects). Many participants who did not remember the mobile did recall
other things, such as doctors, nurses, bright lights, cribs and masks. Also, in both groups, of
those who reported memories of infancy, 49 percent felt that they were real memories, as opposed
to 16 percent who claimed that they were merely fantasies. These findings confirm earlier studies
that many individuals can be led to construct complex, vivid and detailed false memories via a
rather simple procedure. Hypnosis clearly is not necessary.
How False Memories Form
usually a family member, claimed that the event happened. Corroboration of an event by another
person can be a powerful technique for instilling a false memory. In fact, merely claiming to have
seen a person do something can lead to a false confession of wrongdoing.
This was shown in a study by Saul M. Kassin and his colleagues at Williams College, who
investigated the reactions of individuals falsely accused of damaging a computer by pressing the
wrong key. The innocent participants initially denied the charge, but when a confederate said that
she had seen them perform the action, many participants signed a confession, internalized guilt for
the act and went on to confabulate details that were consistent with that belief. These findings show
that false incriminating evidence can induce people to accept guilt for a crime they did not commit,
and even to develop memories to support their guilty feelings.
Research studies are beginning to give us an understanding of how false memories of complete,
emotional and self-participatory experiences are created in adults. First, there are social demands
on individuals to remember; for instance, researchers exert some pressure on participants in a study
to come up with memories. Second, memory construction by imagining events can be explicitly
encouraged when people are having trouble remembering. And, finally, individuals can be
encouraged not to think about whether their constructions are real or not. Creation of false
memories are most likely to occur when these external factors are present, whether this occurs in
an experimental setting, in a therapeutic setting, or in everyday activities.
False memories are constructed by combining actual memories with the content of suggestions
received from others. During the process, individuals may forget the source of the information.
This is a classic example of source confusion, in which the content and the source become
Of course, simply because we can implant false childhood memories in some individuals in no way
implies that all memories that arise after suggestion are necessarily false. Put another way,
although experimental work on false memory creation may raise doubt about the validity of
long-buried memories, such as repeated trauma, it in no way disproves them. Without
corroboration, there is little that can be done to help even the most experienced evaluator to
differentiate true memories from ones that are suggestively planted.
The precise mechanisms by which such false memories are constructed await further research. We
still have much to learn about the degree of confidence and the characteristics of false memories
created in these ways, and we need to discover what types of individuals are particularly
susceptible to these forms of suggestion and, conversely, who is resistant.
As we continue this work, it is important to heed the cautionary tale in the data we have already
obtained: mental health professionals and others must be aware of how much they can influence the
recall of events and of the great need for maintaining restraint in situations in which imagination is
used as an aid in recovering presumably lost memories.
Elizabeth F. Loftus is professor of psychology and adjunct professor of law at the University of
Washington. She received her Ph.D. in psychology from Stanford University in 1970. Her
research has focused on human memory, eiewitness testimony and courtroom procedure. Loftus
has published 18 books and more than 250 scientific articles and has servd as an expert witness or
consultant in hundreds of trials, including the mcMartin preschool molestation case. Her book
Eyewitness Testimony won a national media Award from the American Psychological Foundation.
She has received honorary doctorates from Miami University, Leiden University and John Jay
College of Criminal Justice. Loftus was recently elected president of the American Psychological
The Social Psychology of False Confessions: Compliance, internalization, and confabulation, Saul
M. Kassin and Katherine L. Kiechel in Psychological Science, Vol. 7, No. 3, pagees 125-128;
Imagination Inflation: Imagining a childhood event inflates confidence that it occurred. Maryanne
Garry, Charles G. Manning, Elizabeth F. Loftus, Steven J. Sherman in Psychonomic Bulletin and
Review, vol. 3, No. 2, pages 208-214; June 1996.
Remembering our past: Studies in autobiographical memory. Edited by David C. Rubin.
Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Searching for Memory: The Brain, the Mind, and the Past. Daniel L. Schacter. BasicBooks, 1996.